8 sept 2010
IDF expects flood of civil suits over Cast Lead
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
The defense establishment is bracing itself for a flood of lawsuits from Palestinian civilians seeking financial compensation over Operation Cast Lead.
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
Human rights organizations say about 40,000 Palestinian homes in Gaza were destroyed during the fighting in late 2008 and early 2009. Factories, public buildings and farms also sustained extensive damage.
In its response to the Goldstone report on the war, the IDF said civilian homes were destroyed when the army believed Palestinian militants were operating out of the buildings, using them to store weapons or had booby-trapped them.
While the IDF decided in the wake of its investigations not to prosecute soldiers or officers who took part in destructive operations, Palestinian civilians may still file civil damage claims.
A few dozen such suits have been submitted to the courts, but hundreds and perhaps thousands more are expected over the next few months. Palestinians may file for compensation for damage from IDF operations up to two years after the event, as long as they submit notice of intent to sue within 60 days.
Defense and justice ministry officials believe the attorneys handling these claims intentionally delayed filing suits for more than a year and a half and intend to submit them en masse shortly before the two-year deadline expires.
One legal official in the defense establishment said the assumption is that these lawyers are working with European human rights group to "flood" the system with hundreds of claims. The aim, the source said, is to exhaust the State Prosecutor's Office in the hope of obtaining more generous settlements for their clients.
In preparation for submitting claims, Palestinian attorneys and humanitarian organizations in Gaza deposed witnesses and gathered material evidence immediately after the end of Operation Cast Lead.
Officials in the judicial system said they are prepared for a large number of lawsuits from Gazan civilians.
They do not intend to hire additional attorneys to handle the claims, and the plaintiffs will simply have to wait because claims are still being processed from Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, they said.
The defense establishment is bracing itself for a flood of lawsuits from Palestinian civilians seeking financial compensation over Operation Cast Lead.
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
Human rights organizations say about 40,000 Palestinian homes in Gaza were destroyed during the fighting in late 2008 and early 2009. Factories, public buildings and farms also sustained extensive damage.
In its response to the Goldstone report on the war, the IDF said civilian homes were destroyed when the army believed Palestinian militants were operating out of the buildings, using them to store weapons or had booby-trapped them.
While the IDF decided in the wake of its investigations not to prosecute soldiers or officers who took part in destructive operations, Palestinian civilians may still file civil damage claims.
A few dozen such suits have been submitted to the courts, but hundreds and perhaps thousands more are expected over the next few months. Palestinians may file for compensation for damage from IDF operations up to two years after the event, as long as they submit notice of intent to sue within 60 days.
Defense and justice ministry officials believe the attorneys handling these claims intentionally delayed filing suits for more than a year and a half and intend to submit them en masse shortly before the two-year deadline expires.
One legal official in the defense establishment said the assumption is that these lawyers are working with European human rights group to "flood" the system with hundreds of claims. The aim, the source said, is to exhaust the State Prosecutor's Office in the hope of obtaining more generous settlements for their clients.
In preparation for submitting claims, Palestinian attorneys and humanitarian organizations in Gaza deposed witnesses and gathered material evidence immediately after the end of Operation Cast Lead.
Officials in the judicial system said they are prepared for a large number of lawsuits from Gazan civilians.
They do not intend to hire additional attorneys to handle the claims, and the plaintiffs will simply have to wait because claims are still being processed from Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, they said.
5 sept 2010
Group: Officer who killed Palestinian received public money
Shahar Mizrahi
An Israeli police officer convicted of manslaughter for killing an unarmed Palestinian received over $90,000 of Israeli public money, a rights group said Sunday.
Adalah, the legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel, said Sunday that it had obtained internal Israeli police documentation revealing that officer Shahar Mizrahi received almost 350,000 shekels (over $90,000) in financial assistance from the Israeli police for his legal defense.
In July 2006, Mizrahi shot Mahammoud Ghanayim, 24, in the head at close range after using his gun to smash the window of the car in which Ghanayim was sitting.
Ghanayim was suspected of stealing a car, but investigations by advocacy group Mossawa found that, despite police claims, Ghanayim was the documented owner of the car he was driving.
Mizrahi was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. The officer appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.
On 21 July 2010 the Supreme Court overturned Mizrahi’s appeal and doubled his sentence to 30 months, noting that Ghanayim did not pose any threat when Mizrahi shot him at close range. The court also noted that Mizrahi had changed his testimony several times during investigations.
An Israeli police officer convicted of manslaughter for killing an unarmed Palestinian received over $90,000 of Israeli public money, a rights group said Sunday.
Adalah, the legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel, said Sunday that it had obtained internal Israeli police documentation revealing that officer Shahar Mizrahi received almost 350,000 shekels (over $90,000) in financial assistance from the Israeli police for his legal defense.
In July 2006, Mizrahi shot Mahammoud Ghanayim, 24, in the head at close range after using his gun to smash the window of the car in which Ghanayim was sitting.
Ghanayim was suspected of stealing a car, but investigations by advocacy group Mossawa found that, despite police claims, Ghanayim was the documented owner of the car he was driving.
Mizrahi was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. The officer appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.
On 21 July 2010 the Supreme Court overturned Mizrahi’s appeal and doubled his sentence to 30 months, noting that Ghanayim did not pose any threat when Mizrahi shot him at close range. The court also noted that Mizrahi had changed his testimony several times during investigations.
|
Mahammoud Ghanayim
Adalah reported that Israeli police gave Mizrahi over 161,000 shekels (more than $42,500) for legal expenses in the initial criminal case, and a further 186,000 shekels (almost $50,000) for his appeal to the Supreme Court. |
The decision of the Supreme Court to extend Mizrahi’s sentence was met with condemnation from government and police officials.
"I won’t merely support a pardon bid, I’ll lead it," Internal Security Minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch said, adding that the sentence sent "a terrible message to police officers."
Mizrahi remained a salaried employee of the Israeli police after his indictment, and even after his appeal to the Supreme Court failed, Adalah said.
Orna Kohn, an attorney for Adalah, wrote to head of Human Resources of the Israeli Police, Amihai Shai on 1 September asking under what grounds Mizrahi was granted this support.
"This is an extreme case whereby a police officer was indicted and convicted of manslaughter, appeals to the Supreme Court which upholds the conviction and doubles his sentence, and yet he remained a police officer throughout this entire process. The police gave him extraordinary financial assistance for his legal defense, essentially public money," Kohn said.
"I won’t merely support a pardon bid, I’ll lead it," Internal Security Minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch said, adding that the sentence sent "a terrible message to police officers."
Mizrahi remained a salaried employee of the Israeli police after his indictment, and even after his appeal to the Supreme Court failed, Adalah said.
Orna Kohn, an attorney for Adalah, wrote to head of Human Resources of the Israeli Police, Amihai Shai on 1 September asking under what grounds Mizrahi was granted this support.
"This is an extreme case whereby a police officer was indicted and convicted of manslaughter, appeals to the Supreme Court which upholds the conviction and doubles his sentence, and yet he remained a police officer throughout this entire process. The police gave him extraordinary financial assistance for his legal defense, essentially public money," Kohn said.
aug 2010
by Francis A. Boyle Professor of International Law
(The author served as Attorney of Record in the lawsuit against General Yaron in Ali Aidi v. Yaron, 672 Fed. Supp. 516 (D.D.C. 1987), Palestine Yearbook of International Law, Vol. V, 1989.)
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has nominated former Major General Amos Yaron to serve as director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry, while Barak himself retains the portfolio of Minister of Defense. According to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Yaron, whose appointment must be confirmed by the Israeli Cabinet, is a war criminal by virtue of his command responsibility for the murder of about 2000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacre in Beirut, Lebanon.
Should Yaron's appointment be confirmed, the U.S. government will be aiding and abetting the work of an infamous war criminal. In Fiscal Year 2000, Israel is scheduled to receive $1.92 billion dollars in U.S. military aid out of a total annual U.S. aid package to Israel worth $2.94 billion.
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, driving as far north as the capital, Beirut, purportedly in an effort to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization. In August 1982, special U.S. envoy Philip Habib negotiated the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Beirut. According to that agreement the United States government guaranteed the safety of the remaining Palestinian civilians and obtained Israel's assurance that its armed forces would not enter West Beirut. Israel, breaking its own pledge, occupied West Beirut and surrounded the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 15, 1982.
On September 16, then Brigadier General Amos Yaron, acting under orders from the Israeli Ministry of Defense under General Ariel Sharon, allowed
Phalangist troops to enter the refugee camps even though the same troops had previously engaged in massacres of Palestinians living in Lebanon. The
killing at the refugee camps went on for three days. During nighttime Phalangist operations, Yaron's troops fired illumination rounds so the Phalangists could continue their bloody work. Israeli troops, under the command of Yaron, blocked the exits of the camps to prevent the refugees from escaping and supplied the Phalangists with at least one bulldozer, which was used to cover bodies with rubble.
According to the official Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the massacre (the so-called Kahan Commission), Yaron, who was present on the roof of the
IDF forward command post overlooking the Shatila camp on the evening of September 16, knew then that women and children were being killed by
Phalangist militiamen who had entered the camps by prior arrangement with the Israeli military. Not until the morning of September 18 did Yaron move
to end the killings. Israeli military intelligence later underestimated the death toll at between 700 and 800, which was criminal enough. In his testimony to the Kahan Commission, Yaron said he was "happy" about the decision to send the Phalangist forces into the refugee camps because "the fighting serves their purposes as well, so let them participate and not let the IDF do everything."
Under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which was signed by both the United States and Israel, by his complicity in the massacre, Yaron allowed the willful causing of "great suffering" and "serious injury" to the residents of the camps, who were legally "protected persons" thereunder.
In so doing, Yaron was guilty of "grave breaches" under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In other words, because of his command
responsibilities during the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Yaron was personally responsible for the commission of "war crimes" under general principles of
both customary and conventional international law.
On August 1, 1986, the Israeli government announced that it was nominating Yaron as its Military Attaché to the United States and Canada. Immediately
thereafter, this author and Mr. Abdeen Jabara, Esq. who had recently become President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in
Washington, D.C., decided to launch a campaign to prevent the United States government from accepting Yaron's diplomatic credentials and admitting him into the country.
Together, the two of us drafted telegrams to Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Attorney General Edwin Meese pointing out that Yaron was responsible for the commission of "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the role that he played in supervising the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
As such, the United States government was under an absolute obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention to prosecute Yaron for these heinous war crimes should he set foot on United States territory. Therefore, the telegrams argued, the United States government must not allow Yaron to enter the country for any reason other than prosecution. Otherwise, the United States government would be in breach of its own obligations under the Fourth Geneva Contention.
ADC sent similar telegrams to the ambassadors for all states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, requesting that pursuant to common article 1, their governments had an obligation to intervene with the United States government to demand that the latter not accept Yaron's diplomatic
credentials. A few European states did indeed take this matter up with the United States government.
In the meantime, this author sent a letter to the Legal Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry stating that in the event Yaron were to set foot upon United States territory, he would personally sue Yaron in a U.S. court for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
These vigorous efforts by this author, Jabara, the ADC, and others led the Reagan administration to hold up Yaron's Letter of Accreditation for a period of three months. According to the Israeli Press, these protests against Yaron's appointment were instrumental in prompting Washington to seek Yaron's recall. Israeli papers reported that the behind-the-scenes diplomatic fury which resulted over Yaron's nomination came after the Department of Defense received hundreds of letters from Arab-Americans and liberal Jewish groups protesting Yaron's presence in the United States.
Several meetings were held between Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz over the question of Yaron's suitability to serve as Defense Attaché in light of his involvement in the Beirut massacres. The Israeli daily Davar, associated with the Labor Party, first broke the story of the meetings between U.S. and Israeli officials over Yaron in its October 22 edition, indicating that Washington and Tel Aviv had agreed that Yaron would be recalled but not immediately.
Both sides later denied that a deal had been made, although a spokesperson for the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., Yossi Gal, confirmed that the negotiations had indeed taken place. On October 24, 1986 the Reagan administration officially accepted Yaron's Letter of Accreditation.
Undaunted, ADC's Abdeen Jabara flew to Ottawa to convince the Canadian government to refuse diplomatic accreditation to Yaron as Israel's Military
Attaché to Canada. To its great credit, on March 5, 1987 the Canadian government refused to accept Yaron's diplomatic credentials. Explaining the move, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said that Canada did not consider it "appropriate" to accept Yaron's credentials. Officials of the External Affairs Ministry indicated privately that Canada had based its decision on the findings of the Kahan Commission Report.
On March 28 the Jerusalem Post reported that Yaron had asked his superiors to cut short his Washington assignment. A "cool" reception from the diplomatic community in the U.S., followed by Canada's refusal to accept his appointment to Ottawa, were factors leading to Yaron's request to be considered for a territorial command, according to their sources. Apparently, Canada had rejected Yaron's credentials with Washington's approval.
In the meantime, this author, Abdeen Jabara, Linda Huber, Esq., an attorney in Washington, D.C., Professor Linda Malone, now of the William and Mary School of Law, and Albert Mokhiber, Esq., then ADC Legal Affairs Director and later its President, convened at ADC Headquarters for the purpose of preparing a civil lawsuit against Yaron on behalf of some of the victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
This author and Linda Huber agreed to serve as Attorneys of Record for three Palestinian women who survived the massacre. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on May 4, 1987. The Complaint alleged that Yaron bore responsibility for the murder of the family members of the three Palestinian women under international treaties including the Nuremberg Principles, which forbid war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The plaintiffs, Fatimeh Ali Aidi, Zeineb Sa'ad and Samia A. Khatib, all three of whom resided in the Shatila camp, each asked for $100,000 in punitive damages and an undetermined amount in compensatory damages against Yaron. The Complaint stated that the husband of Fatimeh Ali Aidi, the father and sister of Zeineb Sa'ad, and the mother, sister and five nieces and nephews of Samia A. Khatib, were "murdered in the Shatila Camp by agents of the defendant Yaron" and the IDF during Israel's occupation of West Beirut in September 1982.
The lawsuit stated that Yaron was guilty of violating the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the killing of civilians under military occupation and incriminates an occupying power even if its "agents" carry out the killing. Citing the Nuremberg Principles, which were designed to prevent the repetition of crimes against humanity such as were committed by the Nazi occupying power in Europe during the Second World War, the suit alleged that Yaron's position of authority, and knowledge of the ongoing massacre, rendered him personally responsible for the actions of the Phalangists.
Yaron was served with a summons to appear in court as he left his Chevy Chase, Maryland apartment for work on the morning of May 5, one day after the suit was filed.
On May 20, 50 demonstrators picketed Yaron's apartment building, calling attention to current efforts by France, Israel and the Soviet Union to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, while Yaron continued to enjoy diplomatic status in the United States.
On May 26, a motion to dismiss the case was filed by lawyers representing Yaron, claiming that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity as Israel's Military Attaché, that the statute of limitations had expired, and that the international treaties cited by the plaintiffs allowed only governments, not individuals, to bring legal action for alleged treaty violations.
During the course of the Yaron litigation, the United States Department of State took the official position that Yaron possessed diplomatic immunity under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the U.S. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978. Yet, at the exact same time the U.S. State Department was also involved in efforts to put former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on the so-called "watch list" in order to bar his entry into the United States on the alleged grounds that he might have been an accomplice to the commission of war crimes during the Second World War.
The U.S. Department of Justice so barred Waldheim as of April 27, 1987. By contrast, Yaron was directly responsible for the murder of about 2000 innocent Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, including women, children, and old people.
Unlike Waldheim, however, not only was Yaron permitted to enter the United States, but the U.S. government also accorded him full diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention. The gross hypocrisy involved in these two contemporaneous decisions by the U.S. government could not have been more blatant.
Nevertheless, the Federal District Judge who handled the Yaron case decided to defer to the wishes of the Department of State in this matter. The Judge observed that this was not a criminal tribunal, but only a civil action.
Hence, the Judge ruled that Yaron was immune from civil proceedings in United States courts irrespective of whether or not he would be immune from criminal proceedings in some other forum. The Judge basically ignored expert Affidavits submitted to the Court independently by three American Professors of International Law, all of whom stated under oath that acknowledged war criminals such as Yaron were both criminally and civilly liable for the commission of their international crimes, whether in United States courts or elsewhere.
Despite this setback, ADC continued to mount its nationwide campaign to convince Yaron that an acknowledged war criminal was not wanted by the American people to be roaming the streets of their capital, and that he should go home.
Exactly one year after the Israeli government press office had quietly announced the appointment of Yaron, the Jerusalem Post of Aug. 1, 1987 reported that Yaron was to resign his diplomatic position "for reasons related to a lingering controversy" about his role in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre.
This "lingering controversy" was fueled by ADC's "Send Yaron Home" campaign. According to the Jerusalem Post, although the Reagan administration initially accepted Yaron's posting to Washington, it had since been actively trying to encourage Israel to recall him. Eventually Yaron returned home to Israel, where he currently lives and works with his fellow war criminals in the IDF and the Israeli government.
Under basic principles of international law, the U.S. government must be concerned about directing billions of U.S. tax dollars to the control of an acknowledged war criminal such as Yaron. Accordingly, the U.S. government must discontinue all military assistance to Israel if Yaron's appointment is
confirmed. Also, there is no statute of limitations for war crimes.
Should Yaron attempt to return to the U.S., the U.S. government is obligated to prosecute him for war crimes. The same conclusion follows for any other
State where Yaron might travel. Legally, General Yaron is just like General Pinochet: Hostis humani generis--The enemy of all humankind!
Francis A. Boyle
Law Building
504 E. Pennsylvania Ave.
Champaign, IL 61820 USA
217-333-7954 (Voice)
217-244-1478 (Fax)
(personal comments only)
(The author served as Attorney of Record in the lawsuit against General Yaron in Ali Aidi v. Yaron, 672 Fed. Supp. 516 (D.D.C. 1987), Palestine Yearbook of International Law, Vol. V, 1989.)
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has nominated former Major General Amos Yaron to serve as director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry, while Barak himself retains the portfolio of Minister of Defense. According to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Yaron, whose appointment must be confirmed by the Israeli Cabinet, is a war criminal by virtue of his command responsibility for the murder of about 2000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacre in Beirut, Lebanon.
Should Yaron's appointment be confirmed, the U.S. government will be aiding and abetting the work of an infamous war criminal. In Fiscal Year 2000, Israel is scheduled to receive $1.92 billion dollars in U.S. military aid out of a total annual U.S. aid package to Israel worth $2.94 billion.
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, driving as far north as the capital, Beirut, purportedly in an effort to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization. In August 1982, special U.S. envoy Philip Habib negotiated the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Beirut. According to that agreement the United States government guaranteed the safety of the remaining Palestinian civilians and obtained Israel's assurance that its armed forces would not enter West Beirut. Israel, breaking its own pledge, occupied West Beirut and surrounded the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 15, 1982.
On September 16, then Brigadier General Amos Yaron, acting under orders from the Israeli Ministry of Defense under General Ariel Sharon, allowed
Phalangist troops to enter the refugee camps even though the same troops had previously engaged in massacres of Palestinians living in Lebanon. The
killing at the refugee camps went on for three days. During nighttime Phalangist operations, Yaron's troops fired illumination rounds so the Phalangists could continue their bloody work. Israeli troops, under the command of Yaron, blocked the exits of the camps to prevent the refugees from escaping and supplied the Phalangists with at least one bulldozer, which was used to cover bodies with rubble.
According to the official Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the massacre (the so-called Kahan Commission), Yaron, who was present on the roof of the
IDF forward command post overlooking the Shatila camp on the evening of September 16, knew then that women and children were being killed by
Phalangist militiamen who had entered the camps by prior arrangement with the Israeli military. Not until the morning of September 18 did Yaron move
to end the killings. Israeli military intelligence later underestimated the death toll at between 700 and 800, which was criminal enough. In his testimony to the Kahan Commission, Yaron said he was "happy" about the decision to send the Phalangist forces into the refugee camps because "the fighting serves their purposes as well, so let them participate and not let the IDF do everything."
Under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which was signed by both the United States and Israel, by his complicity in the massacre, Yaron allowed the willful causing of "great suffering" and "serious injury" to the residents of the camps, who were legally "protected persons" thereunder.
In so doing, Yaron was guilty of "grave breaches" under Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In other words, because of his command
responsibilities during the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Yaron was personally responsible for the commission of "war crimes" under general principles of
both customary and conventional international law.
On August 1, 1986, the Israeli government announced that it was nominating Yaron as its Military Attaché to the United States and Canada. Immediately
thereafter, this author and Mr. Abdeen Jabara, Esq. who had recently become President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in
Washington, D.C., decided to launch a campaign to prevent the United States government from accepting Yaron's diplomatic credentials and admitting him into the country.
Together, the two of us drafted telegrams to Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Attorney General Edwin Meese pointing out that Yaron was responsible for the commission of "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the role that he played in supervising the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
As such, the United States government was under an absolute obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention to prosecute Yaron for these heinous war crimes should he set foot on United States territory. Therefore, the telegrams argued, the United States government must not allow Yaron to enter the country for any reason other than prosecution. Otherwise, the United States government would be in breach of its own obligations under the Fourth Geneva Contention.
ADC sent similar telegrams to the ambassadors for all states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, requesting that pursuant to common article 1, their governments had an obligation to intervene with the United States government to demand that the latter not accept Yaron's diplomatic
credentials. A few European states did indeed take this matter up with the United States government.
In the meantime, this author sent a letter to the Legal Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry stating that in the event Yaron were to set foot upon United States territory, he would personally sue Yaron in a U.S. court for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
These vigorous efforts by this author, Jabara, the ADC, and others led the Reagan administration to hold up Yaron's Letter of Accreditation for a period of three months. According to the Israeli Press, these protests against Yaron's appointment were instrumental in prompting Washington to seek Yaron's recall. Israeli papers reported that the behind-the-scenes diplomatic fury which resulted over Yaron's nomination came after the Department of Defense received hundreds of letters from Arab-Americans and liberal Jewish groups protesting Yaron's presence in the United States.
Several meetings were held between Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz over the question of Yaron's suitability to serve as Defense Attaché in light of his involvement in the Beirut massacres. The Israeli daily Davar, associated with the Labor Party, first broke the story of the meetings between U.S. and Israeli officials over Yaron in its October 22 edition, indicating that Washington and Tel Aviv had agreed that Yaron would be recalled but not immediately.
Both sides later denied that a deal had been made, although a spokesperson for the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C., Yossi Gal, confirmed that the negotiations had indeed taken place. On October 24, 1986 the Reagan administration officially accepted Yaron's Letter of Accreditation.
Undaunted, ADC's Abdeen Jabara flew to Ottawa to convince the Canadian government to refuse diplomatic accreditation to Yaron as Israel's Military
Attaché to Canada. To its great credit, on March 5, 1987 the Canadian government refused to accept Yaron's diplomatic credentials. Explaining the move, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said that Canada did not consider it "appropriate" to accept Yaron's credentials. Officials of the External Affairs Ministry indicated privately that Canada had based its decision on the findings of the Kahan Commission Report.
On March 28 the Jerusalem Post reported that Yaron had asked his superiors to cut short his Washington assignment. A "cool" reception from the diplomatic community in the U.S., followed by Canada's refusal to accept his appointment to Ottawa, were factors leading to Yaron's request to be considered for a territorial command, according to their sources. Apparently, Canada had rejected Yaron's credentials with Washington's approval.
In the meantime, this author, Abdeen Jabara, Linda Huber, Esq., an attorney in Washington, D.C., Professor Linda Malone, now of the William and Mary School of Law, and Albert Mokhiber, Esq., then ADC Legal Affairs Director and later its President, convened at ADC Headquarters for the purpose of preparing a civil lawsuit against Yaron on behalf of some of the victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
This author and Linda Huber agreed to serve as Attorneys of Record for three Palestinian women who survived the massacre. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on May 4, 1987. The Complaint alleged that Yaron bore responsibility for the murder of the family members of the three Palestinian women under international treaties including the Nuremberg Principles, which forbid war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The plaintiffs, Fatimeh Ali Aidi, Zeineb Sa'ad and Samia A. Khatib, all three of whom resided in the Shatila camp, each asked for $100,000 in punitive damages and an undetermined amount in compensatory damages against Yaron. The Complaint stated that the husband of Fatimeh Ali Aidi, the father and sister of Zeineb Sa'ad, and the mother, sister and five nieces and nephews of Samia A. Khatib, were "murdered in the Shatila Camp by agents of the defendant Yaron" and the IDF during Israel's occupation of West Beirut in September 1982.
The lawsuit stated that Yaron was guilty of violating the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the killing of civilians under military occupation and incriminates an occupying power even if its "agents" carry out the killing. Citing the Nuremberg Principles, which were designed to prevent the repetition of crimes against humanity such as were committed by the Nazi occupying power in Europe during the Second World War, the suit alleged that Yaron's position of authority, and knowledge of the ongoing massacre, rendered him personally responsible for the actions of the Phalangists.
Yaron was served with a summons to appear in court as he left his Chevy Chase, Maryland apartment for work on the morning of May 5, one day after the suit was filed.
On May 20, 50 demonstrators picketed Yaron's apartment building, calling attention to current efforts by France, Israel and the Soviet Union to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, while Yaron continued to enjoy diplomatic status in the United States.
On May 26, a motion to dismiss the case was filed by lawyers representing Yaron, claiming that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity as Israel's Military Attaché, that the statute of limitations had expired, and that the international treaties cited by the plaintiffs allowed only governments, not individuals, to bring legal action for alleged treaty violations.
During the course of the Yaron litigation, the United States Department of State took the official position that Yaron possessed diplomatic immunity under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the U.S. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978. Yet, at the exact same time the U.S. State Department was also involved in efforts to put former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on the so-called "watch list" in order to bar his entry into the United States on the alleged grounds that he might have been an accomplice to the commission of war crimes during the Second World War.
The U.S. Department of Justice so barred Waldheim as of April 27, 1987. By contrast, Yaron was directly responsible for the murder of about 2000 innocent Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, including women, children, and old people.
Unlike Waldheim, however, not only was Yaron permitted to enter the United States, but the U.S. government also accorded him full diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention. The gross hypocrisy involved in these two contemporaneous decisions by the U.S. government could not have been more blatant.
Nevertheless, the Federal District Judge who handled the Yaron case decided to defer to the wishes of the Department of State in this matter. The Judge observed that this was not a criminal tribunal, but only a civil action.
Hence, the Judge ruled that Yaron was immune from civil proceedings in United States courts irrespective of whether or not he would be immune from criminal proceedings in some other forum. The Judge basically ignored expert Affidavits submitted to the Court independently by three American Professors of International Law, all of whom stated under oath that acknowledged war criminals such as Yaron were both criminally and civilly liable for the commission of their international crimes, whether in United States courts or elsewhere.
Despite this setback, ADC continued to mount its nationwide campaign to convince Yaron that an acknowledged war criminal was not wanted by the American people to be roaming the streets of their capital, and that he should go home.
Exactly one year after the Israeli government press office had quietly announced the appointment of Yaron, the Jerusalem Post of Aug. 1, 1987 reported that Yaron was to resign his diplomatic position "for reasons related to a lingering controversy" about his role in the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre.
This "lingering controversy" was fueled by ADC's "Send Yaron Home" campaign. According to the Jerusalem Post, although the Reagan administration initially accepted Yaron's posting to Washington, it had since been actively trying to encourage Israel to recall him. Eventually Yaron returned home to Israel, where he currently lives and works with his fellow war criminals in the IDF and the Israeli government.
Under basic principles of international law, the U.S. government must be concerned about directing billions of U.S. tax dollars to the control of an acknowledged war criminal such as Yaron. Accordingly, the U.S. government must discontinue all military assistance to Israel if Yaron's appointment is
confirmed. Also, there is no statute of limitations for war crimes.
Should Yaron attempt to return to the U.S., the U.S. government is obligated to prosecute him for war crimes. The same conclusion follows for any other
State where Yaron might travel. Legally, General Yaron is just like General Pinochet: Hostis humani generis--The enemy of all humankind!
Francis A. Boyle
Law Building
504 E. Pennsylvania Ave.
Champaign, IL 61820 USA
217-333-7954 (Voice)
217-244-1478 (Fax)
(personal comments only)
31 aug 2010
The Goldstone effect
For taking a picture with a bound man suspected of terrorism, my son, suspected of insensitivity, was paraded in handcuffs before a lineup of TV cameras for the evening news.
My son and two of his friends from the Nahal Haredi unit stand accused of abusing an arrested member of Hamas. While the IDF pursued its investigation, they sat in jail for 14 days.
The three were accused of taking a picture of themselves standing next to the blindfolded Hamas terror suspect in Jenin eight months ago.
This event occurred after a vigorous year of training and active duty, when they were on their first mission to successfully arrest a terror suspect whose actions, if left unheeded, could have resulted in the loss of innocent life. Like many fresh recruits on their first successful mission, they were excited and wanted to memorialize this first arrest.
I would like to state unequivocally that what they did was morally incorrect. It was childish, insensitive to the prisoner and potentially damaging to Israel. They fully deserve to be reprimanded.
However, the arrest and subsequent accusations seems to have lost all sense of proportion. This is not Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were humiliated and tortured in shocking ways as part of an established pattern of abuse. This is not even Eden Abergil, who posted her photos on Facebook for all to see and reveled in her notoriety.
These photos were never intended to be publicized and were merely in the cellphone memory, largely forgotten by my son and his comrades.
The soldiers have admitted that their actions were inappropriate and immature, but it is also vital to note that they never abused the prisoner in any way, shape or form. The photos themselves do not reflect any abuse, and although the IDF prosecutor claims that a couple of pictures appear to show the soldiers rifles pointed at the prisoner, the photos are entirely ambiguous. The rifles appear to be hanging from their shoulders in the manner typical of IDF soldiers, and certainly not in a threatening way.
As part of the investigation, the IDF prosecutor interviewed the Hamas member in the pictures. He was asked if the soldiers actions were humiliating, and although it must have been very tempting to do otherwise, he replied in the negative. He unequivocally stated that he suffered no threats or ill-treatment other than the embarrassment of the arrest itself.
The IDF prosecutor's written statement to the court states that the importance of the case... is in the context which we live in. After the Goldstone report and the Mavi Marmara [flotilla], in a period when we as a military and a state are under a so-called moral siege, we... are being examined under a magnifying glass. The severity of the actions is beyond the specific incident.
LET ME reiterate. What the boys did was wrong and the army cannot tolerate such conduct. They deserve reproof for their insensitivity. In a state of law we must extend respect even to terrorists, and even when the prisoner is not aware of the disrespect being shown him. Nevertheless, insensitivity is not a crime. To subject them to the humiliation of arrest, hold them in jail for 14 days with barely any contact with their family and to accuse them of serious felonies reflects an absurd lack of perspective.
There is something cruelly ironic in this: For taking a picture of a handcuffed person suspected of terrorism, my son, suspected of insensitivity, was paraded in handcuffs before a lineup of TV cameras for the evening news. Unlike the Hamas member, however, my son was painfully aware of his degradation. And now, he may spend up to a year in jail.
However, the prosecutor's statement indicates that these soldiers were not being punished for their crimes, but for Israel's current international image. Consider that before the Facebook fiasco, the IDF soldier who was videotaped shooting at a manacled prisoner a much more heinous crime served only two days in jail before his trial. It is unconscionable that these imprudent boys should bear the brunt of the distorted view of Israel that is currently spread around the world.
BY PUNISHING our soldiers for perceived crimes, minor errors of judgment, or to avoid the world's hypocrisy is handing a victory to our enemies, and to those, like Justice Richard Goldstone, who have denied our right to self-defense.
Secondly, we will undoubtedly once again need our soldiers to fight be prepared to lay down their lives in our defense. This type of overreaction and punishment will be massively damaging for morale.
They need to know that the authorities will show them empathy and understanding.
Anyone who has served in the army understands the challenges. These are good kids from good homes with parents who encouraged them to serve their country. They literally risk their lives to enter places like Jenin and arrest terrorists. They pass countless sleepless nights so we can sleep comfortably in our beds.
This episode has had a demoralizing effect on the Nahal Haredi, a unit meant to serve as an example for others. In fact, the effect has passed far beyond their unit, to the larger IDF where many are incensed at this overreaction.
Our government refused to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission, and our best legal minds have proven that the Goldstone Report is flawed, distorted and, as the US Congress overwhelmingly voted, irredeemably biased. However, by applying the Goldstone Report as a measure for our soldiers, we give our delegitimizers success.
As lawyer Shlomo Tzipori said, It is not right to take pictures next to a Palestinian with handcuffs, but these soldiers do not need to be hung out to dry. They are paying the price for the Goldstone report and the Mavi Marmara. By indicting the soldiers and handcuffing them, the IDF is the one causing the real damage.
We cannot permit the Goldstone effect to take root in our army's culture. Giving our enemies the power to influence how we judge our soldiers is a very dangerous precedent. While we must always prosecute real criminal activity in the IDF and educate to the highest moral standards, when our fighting men feel the system will offer them up on the altar of Goldstone, we will all pay the price.
The writer is the father of one of the arrested soldiers. His name has been changed to protect his identity.
My son and two of his friends from the Nahal Haredi unit stand accused of abusing an arrested member of Hamas. While the IDF pursued its investigation, they sat in jail for 14 days.
The three were accused of taking a picture of themselves standing next to the blindfolded Hamas terror suspect in Jenin eight months ago.
This event occurred after a vigorous year of training and active duty, when they were on their first mission to successfully arrest a terror suspect whose actions, if left unheeded, could have resulted in the loss of innocent life. Like many fresh recruits on their first successful mission, they were excited and wanted to memorialize this first arrest.
I would like to state unequivocally that what they did was morally incorrect. It was childish, insensitive to the prisoner and potentially damaging to Israel. They fully deserve to be reprimanded.
However, the arrest and subsequent accusations seems to have lost all sense of proportion. This is not Abu Ghraib, where prisoners were humiliated and tortured in shocking ways as part of an established pattern of abuse. This is not even Eden Abergil, who posted her photos on Facebook for all to see and reveled in her notoriety.
These photos were never intended to be publicized and were merely in the cellphone memory, largely forgotten by my son and his comrades.
The soldiers have admitted that their actions were inappropriate and immature, but it is also vital to note that they never abused the prisoner in any way, shape or form. The photos themselves do not reflect any abuse, and although the IDF prosecutor claims that a couple of pictures appear to show the soldiers rifles pointed at the prisoner, the photos are entirely ambiguous. The rifles appear to be hanging from their shoulders in the manner typical of IDF soldiers, and certainly not in a threatening way.
As part of the investigation, the IDF prosecutor interviewed the Hamas member in the pictures. He was asked if the soldiers actions were humiliating, and although it must have been very tempting to do otherwise, he replied in the negative. He unequivocally stated that he suffered no threats or ill-treatment other than the embarrassment of the arrest itself.
The IDF prosecutor's written statement to the court states that the importance of the case... is in the context which we live in. After the Goldstone report and the Mavi Marmara [flotilla], in a period when we as a military and a state are under a so-called moral siege, we... are being examined under a magnifying glass. The severity of the actions is beyond the specific incident.
LET ME reiterate. What the boys did was wrong and the army cannot tolerate such conduct. They deserve reproof for their insensitivity. In a state of law we must extend respect even to terrorists, and even when the prisoner is not aware of the disrespect being shown him. Nevertheless, insensitivity is not a crime. To subject them to the humiliation of arrest, hold them in jail for 14 days with barely any contact with their family and to accuse them of serious felonies reflects an absurd lack of perspective.
There is something cruelly ironic in this: For taking a picture of a handcuffed person suspected of terrorism, my son, suspected of insensitivity, was paraded in handcuffs before a lineup of TV cameras for the evening news. Unlike the Hamas member, however, my son was painfully aware of his degradation. And now, he may spend up to a year in jail.
However, the prosecutor's statement indicates that these soldiers were not being punished for their crimes, but for Israel's current international image. Consider that before the Facebook fiasco, the IDF soldier who was videotaped shooting at a manacled prisoner a much more heinous crime served only two days in jail before his trial. It is unconscionable that these imprudent boys should bear the brunt of the distorted view of Israel that is currently spread around the world.
BY PUNISHING our soldiers for perceived crimes, minor errors of judgment, or to avoid the world's hypocrisy is handing a victory to our enemies, and to those, like Justice Richard Goldstone, who have denied our right to self-defense.
Secondly, we will undoubtedly once again need our soldiers to fight be prepared to lay down their lives in our defense. This type of overreaction and punishment will be massively damaging for morale.
They need to know that the authorities will show them empathy and understanding.
Anyone who has served in the army understands the challenges. These are good kids from good homes with parents who encouraged them to serve their country. They literally risk their lives to enter places like Jenin and arrest terrorists. They pass countless sleepless nights so we can sleep comfortably in our beds.
This episode has had a demoralizing effect on the Nahal Haredi, a unit meant to serve as an example for others. In fact, the effect has passed far beyond their unit, to the larger IDF where many are incensed at this overreaction.
Our government refused to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission, and our best legal minds have proven that the Goldstone Report is flawed, distorted and, as the US Congress overwhelmingly voted, irredeemably biased. However, by applying the Goldstone Report as a measure for our soldiers, we give our delegitimizers success.
As lawyer Shlomo Tzipori said, It is not right to take pictures next to a Palestinian with handcuffs, but these soldiers do not need to be hung out to dry. They are paying the price for the Goldstone report and the Mavi Marmara. By indicting the soldiers and handcuffing them, the IDF is the one causing the real damage.
We cannot permit the Goldstone effect to take root in our army's culture. Giving our enemies the power to influence how we judge our soldiers is a very dangerous precedent. While we must always prosecute real criminal activity in the IDF and educate to the highest moral standards, when our fighting men feel the system will offer them up on the altar of Goldstone, we will all pay the price.
The writer is the father of one of the arrested soldiers. His name has been changed to protect his identity.
30 aug 2010
Not Guilty: Israeli Soldier Shot Palestinian Girl 17 Times
An Israeli army officer, who killed a 13-year-old Palestinian girl by shooting her 17 times, has been acquitted on all charges by an Israeli military court.
Last year, Iman al-Hams walked into a security zone at an Israeli army post along the Gaza Strip border, an area forbidden for all non-military personnel. She was also carrying a backpack, which is a common carrying-case for explosives for suicide bombers.
A soldier in a watchtower saw the girl, and radioed troops on the ground. In a recording obtained by an Israeli television station, the soldier describes Iman as "a little girl" who was "scared to death." Troops opened fire. She dropped the bag and started running. They then fired at the bag, establishing that it did not contain explosives. The recording reveals she was running away from the army post when she was shot.
An officer identified only as "Captain R" moved in for "confirmation of the kill," which is apparently standard procedure. But Palestinian witnesses say while she was lying on the ground, Capt. R opened fire at the girl, emptying his weapon.
On the tape, Captain R "clarifies" to the soldiers under his command why he killed Iman: "This is commander. Anything that's mobile, that moves in the (security) zone, even if it's a three-year-old, needs to be killed."
Captain R was not charged with her killing, rather he was charged with illegal use of his weapon, conduct unbecoming an officer and perverting the course of justice by asking soldiers under his command to alter their accounts of the incident.
Captain R claimed he did not fire the shots at the girl, only near her. But Dr. Mohammed al-Hams, who inspected the child's body, counted numerous wounds.
"She has at least 17 bullets in several parts of the body, all along the chest, hands, arms, legs," he told the British newspaper the Guardian shortly afterwards. "The bullets were large and shot from a close distance. The most serious injuries were to her head. She had three bullets in the head. One bullet was shot from the right side of the face beside the ear. It had a big impact on the whole face."
Following the verdict, Captain R burst into tears, turned to the public benches and said: "I told you I was innocent."
After the verdict, Iman's father, Samir al-Hams, said the army never intended to hold the soldier accountable.
"They did not charge him with Iman's murder, only with small offenses, and now they say he is innocent of those even though he shot my daughter so many times," he said. "This was the cold-blooded murder of a girl. The soldier murdered her once and the court has murdered her again. What is the message? They are telling their soldiers to kill Palestinian children."
Last year, Iman al-Hams walked into a security zone at an Israeli army post along the Gaza Strip border, an area forbidden for all non-military personnel. She was also carrying a backpack, which is a common carrying-case for explosives for suicide bombers.
A soldier in a watchtower saw the girl, and radioed troops on the ground. In a recording obtained by an Israeli television station, the soldier describes Iman as "a little girl" who was "scared to death." Troops opened fire. She dropped the bag and started running. They then fired at the bag, establishing that it did not contain explosives. The recording reveals she was running away from the army post when she was shot.
An officer identified only as "Captain R" moved in for "confirmation of the kill," which is apparently standard procedure. But Palestinian witnesses say while she was lying on the ground, Capt. R opened fire at the girl, emptying his weapon.
On the tape, Captain R "clarifies" to the soldiers under his command why he killed Iman: "This is commander. Anything that's mobile, that moves in the (security) zone, even if it's a three-year-old, needs to be killed."
Captain R was not charged with her killing, rather he was charged with illegal use of his weapon, conduct unbecoming an officer and perverting the course of justice by asking soldiers under his command to alter their accounts of the incident.
Captain R claimed he did not fire the shots at the girl, only near her. But Dr. Mohammed al-Hams, who inspected the child's body, counted numerous wounds.
"She has at least 17 bullets in several parts of the body, all along the chest, hands, arms, legs," he told the British newspaper the Guardian shortly afterwards. "The bullets were large and shot from a close distance. The most serious injuries were to her head. She had three bullets in the head. One bullet was shot from the right side of the face beside the ear. It had a big impact on the whole face."
Following the verdict, Captain R burst into tears, turned to the public benches and said: "I told you I was innocent."
After the verdict, Iman's father, Samir al-Hams, said the army never intended to hold the soldier accountable.
"They did not charge him with Iman's murder, only with small offenses, and now they say he is innocent of those even though he shot my daughter so many times," he said. "This was the cold-blooded murder of a girl. The soldier murdered her once and the court has murdered her again. What is the message? They are telling their soldiers to kill Palestinian children."
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Not guilty. The Israeli captain who emptied his rifle into a Palestinain schoolgirl
By: Chris Mcgreal – The Guardian
--· Officer ignored warnings that teenager was terrified --· Defence says ‘confirming the kill’ standard practice An Israeli army officer who fired the entire magazine of his automatic rifle into a 13-year-old Palestinian girl and then said he would have done the same even if she had been three years old was acquitted on all charges by a military court yesterday. The soldier, who has only been identified as “Captain R”, was charged with relatively minor offences for the killing of Iman al-Hams who was shot 17 times as she ventured near an Israeli army post near Rafah refugee camp in Gaza a year ago. |
The manner of Iman’s killing, and the revelation of a tape recording in which the captain is warned that she was just a child who was “scared to death”, made the shooting one of the most controversial since the Palestinian intifada erupted five years ago even though hundreds of other children have also died.
After the verdict, Iman’s father, Samir al-Hams, said the army never intended to hold the soldier accountable.
“They did not charge him with Iman’s murder, only with small offences, and now they say he is innocent of those even though he shot my daughter so many times,” he said. “This was the cold-blooded murder of a girl. The soldier murdered her once and the court has murdered her again. What is the message? They are telling their soldiers to kill Palestinian children.”
The military court cleared the soldier of illegal use of his weapon, conduct unbecoming an officer and perverting the course of justice by asking soldiers under his command to alter their accounts of the incident.
Capt R’s lawyers argued that the “confirmation of the kill” after a suspect is shot was a standard Israeli military practice to eliminate terrorist threats.
Following the verdict, Capt R burst into tears, turned to the public benches and said: “I told you I was innocent.”
The army’s official account said that Iman was shot for crossing into a security zone carrying her schoolbag which soldiers feared might contain a bomb. It is still not known why the girl ventured into the area but witnesses described her as at least 100 yards from the military post which was in any case well protected.
A recording of radio exchanges between Capt R and his troops obtained by Israeli television revealed that from the beginning soldiers identified Iman as a child.
In the recording, a soldier in a watchtower radioed a colleague in the army post’s operations room and describes Iman as “a little girl” who was “scared to death”. After soldiers first opened fire, she dropped her schoolbag which was then hit by several bullets establishing that it did not contain explosive. At that point she was no longer carrying the bag and, the tape revealed, was heading away from the army post when she was shot.
Although the military speculated that Iman might have been trying to “lure” the soldiers out of their base so they could be attacked by accomplices, Capt R made the decision to lead some of his troops into the open. Shortly afterwards he can be heard on the recording saying that he has shot the girl and, believing her dead, then “confirmed the kill”.
“I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over,” he said.
Palestinian witnesses said they saw the captain shoot Iman twice in the head, walk away, turn back and fire a stream of bullets into her body.
On the tape, Capt R then “clarifies” to the soldiers under his command why he killed Iman: “This is commander. Anything that’s mobile, that moves in the [security] zone, even if it’s a three-year-old, needs to be killed.”
At no point did the Israeli troops come under attack.
The prosecution case was damaged when a soldier who initially said he had seen Capt R point his weapon at the girl’s body and open fire later told the court he had fabricated the story.
Capt R claimed that he had not fired the shots at the girl but near her. However, Dr Mohammed al-Hams, who inspected the child’s body at Rafah hospital, counted numerous wounds.
“She has at least 17 bullets in several parts of the body, all along the chest, hands, arms, legs,” he told the Guardian shortly afterwards. “The bullets were large and shot from a close distance. The most serious injuries were to her head. She had three bullets in the head. One bullet was shot from the right side of the face beside the ear. It had a big impact on the whole face.”
The army’s initial investigation concluded that the captain had “not acted unethically”. But after some of the soldiers under his command went to the Israeli press to give a different version, the military police launched a separate investigation after which he was charged.
Capt R claimed that the soldiers under his command were out to get him because they are Jewish and he is Druze.
The transcript
The following is a recording of a three-way conversation that took place between a soldier in a watchtower, an army operations room and Capt R, who shot the girl
From the watchtower “It’s a little girl. She’s running defensively eastward.” “Are we talking about a girl under the age of 10?” “A girl about 10, she’s behind the embankment, scared to death.” “I think that one of the positions took her out.” “I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over.”
From the operations room “Are we talking about a girl under the age of 10?”
Watchtower “A girl about 10, she’s behind the embankment, scared to death.”
A few minutes later, Iman is shot from one of the army posts
Watchtower “I think that one of the positions took her out.”
Captain R “I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over.”
Capt R then “clarifies” why he killed Iman
“This is commander. Anything that’s mobile, that moves in the zone, even if it’s a three-year-old, needs to be killed. Over.”
After the verdict, Iman’s father, Samir al-Hams, said the army never intended to hold the soldier accountable.
“They did not charge him with Iman’s murder, only with small offences, and now they say he is innocent of those even though he shot my daughter so many times,” he said. “This was the cold-blooded murder of a girl. The soldier murdered her once and the court has murdered her again. What is the message? They are telling their soldiers to kill Palestinian children.”
The military court cleared the soldier of illegal use of his weapon, conduct unbecoming an officer and perverting the course of justice by asking soldiers under his command to alter their accounts of the incident.
Capt R’s lawyers argued that the “confirmation of the kill” after a suspect is shot was a standard Israeli military practice to eliminate terrorist threats.
Following the verdict, Capt R burst into tears, turned to the public benches and said: “I told you I was innocent.”
The army’s official account said that Iman was shot for crossing into a security zone carrying her schoolbag which soldiers feared might contain a bomb. It is still not known why the girl ventured into the area but witnesses described her as at least 100 yards from the military post which was in any case well protected.
A recording of radio exchanges between Capt R and his troops obtained by Israeli television revealed that from the beginning soldiers identified Iman as a child.
In the recording, a soldier in a watchtower radioed a colleague in the army post’s operations room and describes Iman as “a little girl” who was “scared to death”. After soldiers first opened fire, she dropped her schoolbag which was then hit by several bullets establishing that it did not contain explosive. At that point she was no longer carrying the bag and, the tape revealed, was heading away from the army post when she was shot.
Although the military speculated that Iman might have been trying to “lure” the soldiers out of their base so they could be attacked by accomplices, Capt R made the decision to lead some of his troops into the open. Shortly afterwards he can be heard on the recording saying that he has shot the girl and, believing her dead, then “confirmed the kill”.
“I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over,” he said.
Palestinian witnesses said they saw the captain shoot Iman twice in the head, walk away, turn back and fire a stream of bullets into her body.
On the tape, Capt R then “clarifies” to the soldiers under his command why he killed Iman: “This is commander. Anything that’s mobile, that moves in the [security] zone, even if it’s a three-year-old, needs to be killed.”
At no point did the Israeli troops come under attack.
The prosecution case was damaged when a soldier who initially said he had seen Capt R point his weapon at the girl’s body and open fire later told the court he had fabricated the story.
Capt R claimed that he had not fired the shots at the girl but near her. However, Dr Mohammed al-Hams, who inspected the child’s body at Rafah hospital, counted numerous wounds.
“She has at least 17 bullets in several parts of the body, all along the chest, hands, arms, legs,” he told the Guardian shortly afterwards. “The bullets were large and shot from a close distance. The most serious injuries were to her head. She had three bullets in the head. One bullet was shot from the right side of the face beside the ear. It had a big impact on the whole face.”
The army’s initial investigation concluded that the captain had “not acted unethically”. But after some of the soldiers under his command went to the Israeli press to give a different version, the military police launched a separate investigation after which he was charged.
Capt R claimed that the soldiers under his command were out to get him because they are Jewish and he is Druze.
The transcript
The following is a recording of a three-way conversation that took place between a soldier in a watchtower, an army operations room and Capt R, who shot the girl
From the watchtower “It’s a little girl. She’s running defensively eastward.” “Are we talking about a girl under the age of 10?” “A girl about 10, she’s behind the embankment, scared to death.” “I think that one of the positions took her out.” “I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over.”
From the operations room “Are we talking about a girl under the age of 10?”
Watchtower “A girl about 10, she’s behind the embankment, scared to death.”
A few minutes later, Iman is shot from one of the army posts
Watchtower “I think that one of the positions took her out.”
Captain R “I and another soldier … are going in a little nearer, forward, to confirm the kill … Receive a situation report. We fired and killed her … I also confirmed the kill. Over.”
Capt R then “clarifies” why he killed Iman
“This is commander. Anything that’s mobile, that moves in the zone, even if it’s a three-year-old, needs to be killed. Over.”
