22 feb 2013
Archives shed light on the collapse of the Begin government
Ariel Sharon was blissfully oblivious of the reality when he tried to contain the damage in the First Lebanon War by going from an all-out war to a constantly simmering low-intensity conflict
The newly released Sabra and Shatila papers tell us nothing new about the military aspect, but do shed a cold light on then-defense minister, Ariel Sharon.
The Sabra and Shatila documents, released today for publication by the State Archives, are an important addition to public knowledge of the 1982 Lebanon War and the functioning of the Menahem Begin government of the time.
The papers do not shed new light on the massacre. Long passages, mostly quotes of Israeli Defense Force officials, remain censored, keeping alive the suspicion that Israel is still hiding some aspects of its part in the deaths.
Censorship is beyond the control of State Archives, but it casts a shadow on its welcome initiative, and some of the separate but energetic actions by the IDF archives, to reveal documents from the not-so-distant past, especially concerning wars.
But if these documents shed no light on security matters, they do on the disintegration of Menachem Begin's second government, the one without Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizmann and Yigael Yadin.
The main issue is Ariel Sharon's struggle to remain in office after the Commission for Inquiry of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, headed by former Justice Yitzhak Kahan, recommended that he be ousted from the Defense Ministry.
The commission's aim was to remove Sharon altogether from the government, but the legal formulation of the relevant clause enabled him to remain, though not at the Defense Ministry. Sharon's well-known yearning to return to his farm and to the tractor – he presented himself as a farmer – was not to be fulfilled. The guillotine that was prepared for him by his fellow ministers, as he put it, did not work. He was ousted from the Defense Ministry, but not from the government.
But Sharon's battle against the Kahan Commission proved to be Begin's downfall.
At the cabinet meetings, Sharon sounded ungrateful. Begin reminded him that it wasn't an easy decision to appoint him to the Defense Ministry (in the summer of 1981), after he was forced to be satisfied with the Agriculture Ministry in Begin's first government. After Weizmann resigned from the post, Begin himself served as Defense Minster for a year and held many "consultations" – meaning that he was advised against it – until he finally succumbed to Sharon's wish.
Sharon in response broadly hinted that Begin's personal integrity and his direct responsibility for the IDF's inaction as the Christian Phalangist militia entered the Beirut refugee camps and committed the massacre would be internationally condemned if the government were to adopt the Kahan Commission's recommendations.
In order to scare the government and force it to reject the Commission's report, Sharon inflated the Commission's assertions. He argued that they might be used to accuse Israel – or in fact, the Begin government – of being party to a genocide.
The transparent ploy failed thanks to a direct attack by other ministers, led by the National Religious Party's Yosef Burg (who called Sharon "a minister who carries weight"), and assisted by the attorney general, Yitzhak Zamir.
In many ways, the transcription of the meeting where the decision finally fell to oust Sharon from the Defense Ministry, reads like a comedy sketch starring three attorneys: one, who actually practiced law – the attorney general – and two others who had studied law, but engaged in different fields. Begin too, who was sometimes coined a "Polish attorney," is humble and declines to describe himself as professional man of law.
The legal aspect was important, since the politicians hoped to find a legal loophole from the mess. In September 1982, Begin caved in to public pressure, and did exactly what the Golda Meir government did in November 1973, also under Begin's pressure, after the Yom Kippur War. The precedent of the Agranat Comission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court and with the participation of another Supreme Court justice, ultimately led to Begin and the Likud replacing Golda Meir and the Labor party in government.
Sharon tried to argue that the Agranat Commission had five members as opposed to three in the Kahan Commission. The ministers ignored this point.
The Agranat Commission had leveled blame at the army chief of staff and other senior officers but had mercy on the politicians. The Kahan Commission on the other hand added the defense minister to the list of culprits which included the chief of staff, the director of Military Intelligence, and a certain division commander. Thus the Agranat Commission indirectly caused a problem for Sharon in particular, and the Begin government as a whole.
Zamir could have prevented the Lebanon war if he had only seriously handled a complaint concerning Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan's deviations from authority – together with two major generals and two colonels. That was a mistake for which Yehudit Karp, his assistant at the time, expressed regret only last month. The attorney general offered no escape route for Sharon or the government.
Zamir unequivocally rejected all the formulations that would have the report, its findings and assertions – but not its recommendations – adopted. The ministers realized that the attorney general would not help them to present to the public a decision which was self-contradictory.
Sharon's efforts to deflect the debate to Eitan's and the other officers' military achievements were brushed aside, as was his quip at the commission members and the cabinet who had the luxury of reaching decisions "not on the roof of the command post, under fire."
Thus the Begin-Sharon alignment, with Eitan as a junior partner, which had managed to sink the IDF deep into the Lebanese quagmire, disintegrated.
Within six months Begin's condition deteriorated, culminating in his withdrawal, depression and resignation.
The only survivor of these meetings, who was still active in Netanyahu's last government, was Dan Meridor, who served at the time as government secretary.
Meridor who backed Begin against Sharon, doesn't need the State Archives to remind him who gained most by the unraveling of the plot. More than Moshe Arens, who returned from the Washington embassy to the Defense Ministry or Shimon Peres who was appointed prime minister a year and half later, it was the most silent of all ministers, during the massacre and the government debates, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Several months after these decisive government meetings, Shamir became prime minister, a post he held until 1984, and later, for six more years.
The newly released Sabra and Shatila papers tell us nothing new about the military aspect, but do shed a cold light on then-defense minister, Ariel Sharon.
The Sabra and Shatila documents, released today for publication by the State Archives, are an important addition to public knowledge of the 1982 Lebanon War and the functioning of the Menahem Begin government of the time.
The papers do not shed new light on the massacre. Long passages, mostly quotes of Israeli Defense Force officials, remain censored, keeping alive the suspicion that Israel is still hiding some aspects of its part in the deaths.
Censorship is beyond the control of State Archives, but it casts a shadow on its welcome initiative, and some of the separate but energetic actions by the IDF archives, to reveal documents from the not-so-distant past, especially concerning wars.
But if these documents shed no light on security matters, they do on the disintegration of Menachem Begin's second government, the one without Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizmann and Yigael Yadin.
The main issue is Ariel Sharon's struggle to remain in office after the Commission for Inquiry of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, headed by former Justice Yitzhak Kahan, recommended that he be ousted from the Defense Ministry.
The commission's aim was to remove Sharon altogether from the government, but the legal formulation of the relevant clause enabled him to remain, though not at the Defense Ministry. Sharon's well-known yearning to return to his farm and to the tractor – he presented himself as a farmer – was not to be fulfilled. The guillotine that was prepared for him by his fellow ministers, as he put it, did not work. He was ousted from the Defense Ministry, but not from the government.
But Sharon's battle against the Kahan Commission proved to be Begin's downfall.
At the cabinet meetings, Sharon sounded ungrateful. Begin reminded him that it wasn't an easy decision to appoint him to the Defense Ministry (in the summer of 1981), after he was forced to be satisfied with the Agriculture Ministry in Begin's first government. After Weizmann resigned from the post, Begin himself served as Defense Minster for a year and held many "consultations" – meaning that he was advised against it – until he finally succumbed to Sharon's wish.
Sharon in response broadly hinted that Begin's personal integrity and his direct responsibility for the IDF's inaction as the Christian Phalangist militia entered the Beirut refugee camps and committed the massacre would be internationally condemned if the government were to adopt the Kahan Commission's recommendations.
In order to scare the government and force it to reject the Commission's report, Sharon inflated the Commission's assertions. He argued that they might be used to accuse Israel – or in fact, the Begin government – of being party to a genocide.
The transparent ploy failed thanks to a direct attack by other ministers, led by the National Religious Party's Yosef Burg (who called Sharon "a minister who carries weight"), and assisted by the attorney general, Yitzhak Zamir.
In many ways, the transcription of the meeting where the decision finally fell to oust Sharon from the Defense Ministry, reads like a comedy sketch starring three attorneys: one, who actually practiced law – the attorney general – and two others who had studied law, but engaged in different fields. Begin too, who was sometimes coined a "Polish attorney," is humble and declines to describe himself as professional man of law.
The legal aspect was important, since the politicians hoped to find a legal loophole from the mess. In September 1982, Begin caved in to public pressure, and did exactly what the Golda Meir government did in November 1973, also under Begin's pressure, after the Yom Kippur War. The precedent of the Agranat Comission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court and with the participation of another Supreme Court justice, ultimately led to Begin and the Likud replacing Golda Meir and the Labor party in government.
Sharon tried to argue that the Agranat Commission had five members as opposed to three in the Kahan Commission. The ministers ignored this point.
The Agranat Commission had leveled blame at the army chief of staff and other senior officers but had mercy on the politicians. The Kahan Commission on the other hand added the defense minister to the list of culprits which included the chief of staff, the director of Military Intelligence, and a certain division commander. Thus the Agranat Commission indirectly caused a problem for Sharon in particular, and the Begin government as a whole.
Zamir could have prevented the Lebanon war if he had only seriously handled a complaint concerning Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan's deviations from authority – together with two major generals and two colonels. That was a mistake for which Yehudit Karp, his assistant at the time, expressed regret only last month. The attorney general offered no escape route for Sharon or the government.
Zamir unequivocally rejected all the formulations that would have the report, its findings and assertions – but not its recommendations – adopted. The ministers realized that the attorney general would not help them to present to the public a decision which was self-contradictory.
Sharon's efforts to deflect the debate to Eitan's and the other officers' military achievements were brushed aside, as was his quip at the commission members and the cabinet who had the luxury of reaching decisions "not on the roof of the command post, under fire."
Thus the Begin-Sharon alignment, with Eitan as a junior partner, which had managed to sink the IDF deep into the Lebanese quagmire, disintegrated.
Within six months Begin's condition deteriorated, culminating in his withdrawal, depression and resignation.
The only survivor of these meetings, who was still active in Netanyahu's last government, was Dan Meridor, who served at the time as government secretary.
Meridor who backed Begin against Sharon, doesn't need the State Archives to remind him who gained most by the unraveling of the plot. More than Moshe Arens, who returned from the Washington embassy to the Defense Ministry or Shimon Peres who was appointed prime minister a year and half later, it was the most silent of all ministers, during the massacre and the government debates, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Several months after these decisive government meetings, Shamir became prime minister, a post he held until 1984, and later, for six more years.
21 feb 2013
Ariel Sharon feared genocide charges over Israel's role in Sabra and Shatila
Ariel Sharon, center, Rafael Eitan and Amir Drori in the First Lebanon War, 1982
Notes from 1983 cabinet meeting show former defense minister was concerned that the entire government, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin, would be accused of genocide in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon if the Kahan commission's findings were accepted.
Ariel Sharon feared charges of genocide and demands for compensation following the first Lebanon War, state archives have revealed.
The State Archives has just released the protocol of the cabinet meeting in February 1983, in which the commission’s findings were discussed. The protocol reveals some fascinating quotations from the former prime minister, who served as defense minister during that invasion and would return and lead the country two decades later.
Sharon worried that if the government were to accept some of the conclusions of the Kahan commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, it would expose itself to charges of war crimes.
Arriving late at the cabinet meeting, held on February 10, 1983, Sharon launched into a speech outlining his response to the commission’s report. “I’ve had a chance to read it thoroughly, and there are definitely some parts of it which we should embrace. However, there are sections in it that we cannot accept,” he said in his opening comments. “I’ve concluded that some sections must be emphatically rejected by the cabinet. There are portions in the report that we, as Jews and citizens of Israel, as ministers of the Israeli government, cannot accept.”
Sharon lashed out in particular at the commission’s determination that the country’s civilian and military leaders had ignored the risks of such a massacre taking place. “This goes well beyond the personal issue on everyone’s mind, of whether I stay or go,” added Sharon. “The report’s words ‘ignored’ imply that this was done knowingly. That includes all of us sitting around this table who appeared before the commission, including you, Prime Minister [Menachem Begin]. The commission has specifically said that not only was there a risk of a massacre, but that all of us knew this yet ignored it.”
Sharon raised the concern that if the cabinet accepted that they knew of the risk, it would thus set into motion demands for reparations based on acts of genocide.
“People wishing us ill, and I’ve already heard this, will say that what occurred in those camps was genocide. I’ve heard this from Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza. He stated that such claims are appropriate, linking the massacres to genocide,” Sharon warned.
Sharon read out to the cabinet the 1950 statute against genocide, and warned that in his interpretation they could all be considered accomplices to the massacre, according to the letter of the law. To illustrate this, he elaborated on the roles of accomplices.
“We all urged this, we all enabled it, by asking them (the Phalangist Christian militias) to enter the camps. We were present, we lit up the area and we evacuated casualties. It is common knowledge that we were in the area to keep the opposition away, and we did not isolate it from other areas. We kept forces in the area to ensure the mission was carried out, and in case they ran into trouble and needed help getting out.”
Based on this interpretation, Sharon asked the cabinet to reject this portion of the report. “Shouldn’t this section shock us? The commission did not hesitate to compare Israel to indirect supporters of pogroms, who committed atrocities against our people. I am revolted by any hint of such an accusation,” he said.
“I reject the conclusion that there was a constant threat of bloodshed wherever the Phalangists were present. It was accepted among us that during the earlier Peace for Galilee operation, in which they operated alongside our forces, they had behaved appropriately."
Sharon stressed that nobody could have foreseen how drastically things would deteriorate.
“I take no issue with the Mossad or with Military Intelligence. Their assessments included no such eventuality. All their experts, as well as civilian and army top brass, swore under oath that they had not foreseen such a risk."
Referring to the commission’s arguments against him personally, Sharon said that he saw no error in his decision to protect the lives of Israel Defense Forces soldiers.
“I want to say something about my alleged errors," he says in the report. "The most serious allegation was that I did not anticipate what would happen when the militias went in. The commission tried to put themselves into my shoes and understand my actions. They explained that by considering saving IDF lives by letting the militias in, I was distracted and disregarded the possible consequences. Honorable Prime Minister, I don’t consider taking action to save our soldiers’ lives a mistake. This should be our primary consideration. I cannot accept that this could ever not be so. I would repeat this again to each one of you individually, before you chop my head off.”
Sharon called on the cabinet to fire him if that was their decision, but said he would not willingly resign. “You can cut off my head any way you choose. You won’t hear a peep from me, but do you wish to force me to do it myself?”
Sharon closed with some firm and caustic words. “I’m willing to volunteer, if necessary, to go and fight to defend Jews anywhere in the world, but don’t ask me to commit suicide. You can chop my head off, and continue to enjoy the spinach and cheese bourekas on this table tomorrow as well. It’s great to sit around this table. You’ll still be here next week, but I’ll be working on my farm. It’s high time people worked in this country, instead of busying themselves with the stock market.”
The cabinet ultimately adopted the Kahan commission’s report against Sharon’s recommendation, and he was ousted from his position as minister of defense. Two decades later, he returned as prime minister.
During the meeting, the ministers could clearly hear the vocal protest demonstration held outside the Prime Minister’s Office by the Peace Now movement, which was calling for Ariel Sharon to be fired.
The real drama occurred when the Prime Minister’s military aide, Lt. Col. Azriel Nevo, interrupted the meeting to announce that an explosive device had gone off amid the demonstrators and had caused injuries. He later added that a hand grenade had been thrown and that there was a lot of commotion, but the police were taking control of the situation.
Sharon said that demonstrators were trying to break through the gate, but were being rebuffed. Chief of Staff Refael Eitan pointed out that there were enough policemen to handle the situation.
Subsequently, Begin again interrupted the discussion, yelling, “Someone is dead! A dead Jew! Azriel, how could this have happened? Is one camp lobbing grenades at the other?"
Nevo replied that this was the assumption, but nothing was confirmed yet.
The cabinet discussion continued. Minister Yosef Burg spoke, not knowing that his son Avrum was among the injured. Nevo interrupted again, saying that a grenade had been thrown, killing one demonstrator and injuring three others. Two policemen were also injured.
The fatality was Emil Grunzweig, a teacher and peace activist. This week marked the 30th anniversary of his death.
Notes from 1983 cabinet meeting show former defense minister was concerned that the entire government, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin, would be accused of genocide in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon if the Kahan commission's findings were accepted.
Ariel Sharon feared charges of genocide and demands for compensation following the first Lebanon War, state archives have revealed.
The State Archives has just released the protocol of the cabinet meeting in February 1983, in which the commission’s findings were discussed. The protocol reveals some fascinating quotations from the former prime minister, who served as defense minister during that invasion and would return and lead the country two decades later.
Sharon worried that if the government were to accept some of the conclusions of the Kahan commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, it would expose itself to charges of war crimes.
Arriving late at the cabinet meeting, held on February 10, 1983, Sharon launched into a speech outlining his response to the commission’s report. “I’ve had a chance to read it thoroughly, and there are definitely some parts of it which we should embrace. However, there are sections in it that we cannot accept,” he said in his opening comments. “I’ve concluded that some sections must be emphatically rejected by the cabinet. There are portions in the report that we, as Jews and citizens of Israel, as ministers of the Israeli government, cannot accept.”
Sharon lashed out in particular at the commission’s determination that the country’s civilian and military leaders had ignored the risks of such a massacre taking place. “This goes well beyond the personal issue on everyone’s mind, of whether I stay or go,” added Sharon. “The report’s words ‘ignored’ imply that this was done knowingly. That includes all of us sitting around this table who appeared before the commission, including you, Prime Minister [Menachem Begin]. The commission has specifically said that not only was there a risk of a massacre, but that all of us knew this yet ignored it.”
Sharon raised the concern that if the cabinet accepted that they knew of the risk, it would thus set into motion demands for reparations based on acts of genocide.
“People wishing us ill, and I’ve already heard this, will say that what occurred in those camps was genocide. I’ve heard this from Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza. He stated that such claims are appropriate, linking the massacres to genocide,” Sharon warned.
Sharon read out to the cabinet the 1950 statute against genocide, and warned that in his interpretation they could all be considered accomplices to the massacre, according to the letter of the law. To illustrate this, he elaborated on the roles of accomplices.
“We all urged this, we all enabled it, by asking them (the Phalangist Christian militias) to enter the camps. We were present, we lit up the area and we evacuated casualties. It is common knowledge that we were in the area to keep the opposition away, and we did not isolate it from other areas. We kept forces in the area to ensure the mission was carried out, and in case they ran into trouble and needed help getting out.”
Based on this interpretation, Sharon asked the cabinet to reject this portion of the report. “Shouldn’t this section shock us? The commission did not hesitate to compare Israel to indirect supporters of pogroms, who committed atrocities against our people. I am revolted by any hint of such an accusation,” he said.
“I reject the conclusion that there was a constant threat of bloodshed wherever the Phalangists were present. It was accepted among us that during the earlier Peace for Galilee operation, in which they operated alongside our forces, they had behaved appropriately."
Sharon stressed that nobody could have foreseen how drastically things would deteriorate.
“I take no issue with the Mossad or with Military Intelligence. Their assessments included no such eventuality. All their experts, as well as civilian and army top brass, swore under oath that they had not foreseen such a risk."
Referring to the commission’s arguments against him personally, Sharon said that he saw no error in his decision to protect the lives of Israel Defense Forces soldiers.
“I want to say something about my alleged errors," he says in the report. "The most serious allegation was that I did not anticipate what would happen when the militias went in. The commission tried to put themselves into my shoes and understand my actions. They explained that by considering saving IDF lives by letting the militias in, I was distracted and disregarded the possible consequences. Honorable Prime Minister, I don’t consider taking action to save our soldiers’ lives a mistake. This should be our primary consideration. I cannot accept that this could ever not be so. I would repeat this again to each one of you individually, before you chop my head off.”
Sharon called on the cabinet to fire him if that was their decision, but said he would not willingly resign. “You can cut off my head any way you choose. You won’t hear a peep from me, but do you wish to force me to do it myself?”
Sharon closed with some firm and caustic words. “I’m willing to volunteer, if necessary, to go and fight to defend Jews anywhere in the world, but don’t ask me to commit suicide. You can chop my head off, and continue to enjoy the spinach and cheese bourekas on this table tomorrow as well. It’s great to sit around this table. You’ll still be here next week, but I’ll be working on my farm. It’s high time people worked in this country, instead of busying themselves with the stock market.”
The cabinet ultimately adopted the Kahan commission’s report against Sharon’s recommendation, and he was ousted from his position as minister of defense. Two decades later, he returned as prime minister.
During the meeting, the ministers could clearly hear the vocal protest demonstration held outside the Prime Minister’s Office by the Peace Now movement, which was calling for Ariel Sharon to be fired.
The real drama occurred when the Prime Minister’s military aide, Lt. Col. Azriel Nevo, interrupted the meeting to announce that an explosive device had gone off amid the demonstrators and had caused injuries. He later added that a hand grenade had been thrown and that there was a lot of commotion, but the police were taking control of the situation.
Sharon said that demonstrators were trying to break through the gate, but were being rebuffed. Chief of Staff Refael Eitan pointed out that there were enough policemen to handle the situation.
Subsequently, Begin again interrupted the discussion, yelling, “Someone is dead! A dead Jew! Azriel, how could this have happened? Is one camp lobbing grenades at the other?"
Nevo replied that this was the assumption, but nothing was confirmed yet.
The cabinet discussion continued. Minister Yosef Burg spoke, not knowing that his son Avrum was among the injured. Nevo interrupted again, saying that a grenade had been thrown, killing one demonstrator and injuring three others. Two policemen were also injured.
The fatality was Emil Grunzweig, a teacher and peace activist. This week marked the 30th anniversary of his death.
14 - 19 feb 2013
Israeli Court Dismisses Three Cast Lead Cases, Denying Palestinians the Right to Judicial Remedy and Compensation
On Thursday, 7 February 2013, The Israeli Southern Central Court in Be’er Sheva dismissed 3 civil claims cases brought before it by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR). These cases concerned three separate incidents involving the killing of 14 Palestinian civilians and wounding of 24 others during the Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip, ‘Operation Cast Lead’, in 2008-2009.
The first case was filed to claim compensation for the victims who suffered losses, during the Israeli forces’ targeting of paramedics of the Al Awda hospital on 4 January 2009. The second case concerned the targeting of a 4th floor apartment with an Israeli artillery shell in the Shejaiyah area of Gaza City on 5 January 2009. In the third case, Israeli forces attacked a family home with flechette bombs during a mourning service, also on 5 January 2009.
These cases were of a civil nature, and sought reparations for the victims of these attacks; PCHR also filed separate criminal complaints for all three incidents before the Military Advocate General (MAG). PCHR has not received any responses from the MAG in relation to two of these cases. In the third case, although the Israeli authorities commenced an examination back in 2009, its outcome has not yet been made available despite PCHR’s repeated requests to the concerned authorities. The dismissal of these civil claims is a serious setback for the victims, denying them their right to accountability and redress, particularly in light of the unjust reasoning behind the court’s decisions.
The court in its reasoning relied on the 2012 Amendment No. 8 to the Israeli Civil Torts Law (Liability of the State),[1] which sweepingly exempts the State of Israel from any liability arising from damages caused to a resident of an enemy territory during a “combat action” or a “military operation”. This amendment, which applies retroactively from 2000 onwards, and specifically in the context of Gaza from 12 September 2005 onwards, widened the scope of “combat action” by including any operations carried out by the Israeli forces in response to terrorism, hostilities, or insurrections, if it is by nature a combat action, given the overall circumstances, including the goal of the action, the geographic location, and the inherent threat to members of the Israeli forces who are involved in carrying out the action.
This amendment disregards the vital question of the legality of these attacks and ignores the damages caused to the victims as a result of such attacks, which can potentially constitute violations of the rules governing the conduct of armed forces during military operations, as prescribed under international humanitarian law. The Amendment no. 8 directly contravenes norms of customary international law, which establish that a State (in this instance Israel) is responsible for all acts committed by persons who are operating as part of its armed forces. Moreover, as a High Contracting Party to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Israel cannot be absolved from any liability it incurs in respect of grave breaches or serious violations, which are committed against the civilian population during military operations.
Most importantly, it must be noted that these decisions form part of a series of measures enacted by the Israeli authorities in recent years, which result in the dismissal of a large amount of cases and are intended to prevent Palestinians from claiming compensation in the event of violations of international law by Israel. Israel classifies the entire occupied Palestinian territory as a ‘conflict zone’ and, since 2007, Israel has prevented Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip – whether victims, witnesses, or their lawyers – from travelling to appear before Israeli courts. As a result, the courts have dismissed many cases under the pretext of the complainants and witnesses not being present during the proceedings.
Such tactics employed by the Israeli judiciary deny Palestinian victims the right to access to justice and the right to an effective remedy with respect to both civil and criminal cases. Such measures very strongly indicate Israel’s unwillingness to fulfil its legal obligations towards the victims of its military operations through its domestic mechanisms. Recourse to international justice mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court, is essential for achieving justice and accountability for Palestinian victims, thereby tackling Israeli impunity and ensuring respect for the rights of Palestinians in the future.
[1] On 16 July 2012, the Israeli Knesset accepted the Law and Explanatory Matters Bill, which was published in the Government Act Bill – 387 in May 2008, page 598.
The first case was filed to claim compensation for the victims who suffered losses, during the Israeli forces’ targeting of paramedics of the Al Awda hospital on 4 January 2009. The second case concerned the targeting of a 4th floor apartment with an Israeli artillery shell in the Shejaiyah area of Gaza City on 5 January 2009. In the third case, Israeli forces attacked a family home with flechette bombs during a mourning service, also on 5 January 2009.
These cases were of a civil nature, and sought reparations for the victims of these attacks; PCHR also filed separate criminal complaints for all three incidents before the Military Advocate General (MAG). PCHR has not received any responses from the MAG in relation to two of these cases. In the third case, although the Israeli authorities commenced an examination back in 2009, its outcome has not yet been made available despite PCHR’s repeated requests to the concerned authorities. The dismissal of these civil claims is a serious setback for the victims, denying them their right to accountability and redress, particularly in light of the unjust reasoning behind the court’s decisions.
The court in its reasoning relied on the 2012 Amendment No. 8 to the Israeli Civil Torts Law (Liability of the State),[1] which sweepingly exempts the State of Israel from any liability arising from damages caused to a resident of an enemy territory during a “combat action” or a “military operation”. This amendment, which applies retroactively from 2000 onwards, and specifically in the context of Gaza from 12 September 2005 onwards, widened the scope of “combat action” by including any operations carried out by the Israeli forces in response to terrorism, hostilities, or insurrections, if it is by nature a combat action, given the overall circumstances, including the goal of the action, the geographic location, and the inherent threat to members of the Israeli forces who are involved in carrying out the action.
This amendment disregards the vital question of the legality of these attacks and ignores the damages caused to the victims as a result of such attacks, which can potentially constitute violations of the rules governing the conduct of armed forces during military operations, as prescribed under international humanitarian law. The Amendment no. 8 directly contravenes norms of customary international law, which establish that a State (in this instance Israel) is responsible for all acts committed by persons who are operating as part of its armed forces. Moreover, as a High Contracting Party to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Israel cannot be absolved from any liability it incurs in respect of grave breaches or serious violations, which are committed against the civilian population during military operations.
Most importantly, it must be noted that these decisions form part of a series of measures enacted by the Israeli authorities in recent years, which result in the dismissal of a large amount of cases and are intended to prevent Palestinians from claiming compensation in the event of violations of international law by Israel. Israel classifies the entire occupied Palestinian territory as a ‘conflict zone’ and, since 2007, Israel has prevented Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip – whether victims, witnesses, or their lawyers – from travelling to appear before Israeli courts. As a result, the courts have dismissed many cases under the pretext of the complainants and witnesses not being present during the proceedings.
Such tactics employed by the Israeli judiciary deny Palestinian victims the right to access to justice and the right to an effective remedy with respect to both civil and criminal cases. Such measures very strongly indicate Israel’s unwillingness to fulfil its legal obligations towards the victims of its military operations through its domestic mechanisms. Recourse to international justice mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court, is essential for achieving justice and accountability for Palestinian victims, thereby tackling Israeli impunity and ensuring respect for the rights of Palestinians in the future.
[1] On 16 July 2012, the Israeli Knesset accepted the Law and Explanatory Matters Bill, which was published in the Government Act Bill – 387 in May 2008, page 598.
18 feb 2013
Israeli court acquits army, justifies its killing of Gazan family
An Israeli court rejected a Palestinian lawsuit filed against the Israeli army regarding its killing of civilians and children from one family in an aerial attack on their house during the 2009 war on the Gaza Strip, and also fined the plaintiffs. The Israeli central court in Beersheba two weeks ago refused the complaint that was filed by Al-Mizan center for human rights against the Israeli army about its bombing of a civilian house belonging to Fayez Saleha on January 9, 2009.
The court also decided to fine the plaintiffs 20,000 shekels as expenses for its adjudication.
The court acquitted the Israeli army and claimed that despite the proved failure of the army to give the residents the chance to leave their house, the Israeli aerial attack happened during wartime.
The court also decided to fine the plaintiffs 20,000 shekels as expenses for its adjudication.
The court acquitted the Israeli army and claimed that despite the proved failure of the army to give the residents the chance to leave their house, the Israeli aerial attack happened during wartime.
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According to a probe into the attack conducted by Al-Mizan center, an Israeli drone had fired one missile at the house, which is located in Beit Lahia north of Gaza, before another Israeli warplane hastened to drop a heavy bomb on it.
The bombing led to the killing of Saleha's wife, all her four children and her young sister. The victims are Randa Fayez, the mother and her kids, Diauddin, aged 14, Bahauddin, four years, Rana, 12, and Rula, one year as well as her sister Fatima, 22. |
Al-Mizan center had filed a request in November 2009 with the Israeli military prosecutor demanding him to open an investigation into the incident, but he closed the probe quickly and did not make any indictments.
13 feb 2013
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'US will block trial of Israelis at ICC'
A political analyst says that the US and some of the European countries are still standing along side the Israelis and supporting them and they will not make it easy for anyone to bring any of the Israeli leaders to justice. The comments came after Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned the Israeli regime for violating the laws of war during its eight-day assault on the Gaza Strip in 2012. Individuals who deliberately order or take part in attacks targeting civilians or civilian objects are responsible for war crimes, the right group noted. Press TV has conducted an interview with Hani al-Bassous, professor at the Islamic University of Gaza, to further discuss the issue. |
16 jan 2013
Report: IOF has orders to shoot at any demonstration
Israeli military investigation into the death of a Palestinian boy in Badares village, west of Ramallah, indicated that he came under heavy fire. Hebrew daily Haaretz said on Wednesday that the preliminary investigation into the incident revealed that Samir Awad was killed in intensive firing.
The report disclosed that the Israeli occupation forces (IOF) have orders to shoot live bullets at any protests, noting that the order had led to the murder of a number of Palestinian youths during recent protests in the West Bank.
The paper said that in another incident the IOF fired 80 live bullets “without convincing reasons” at a demonstration in Nabi Saleh village in Ramallah, which killed Rashid Tamimi, 31.
It said that the IOF commander in the area fired teargas canisters at the youths who were protesting the war on Gaza and when the soldiers ran out of canisters he ordered more of them and ordered his soldiers to use live bullets at the demonstrators who were throwing stones.
The report disclosed that the Israeli occupation forces (IOF) have orders to shoot live bullets at any protests, noting that the order had led to the murder of a number of Palestinian youths during recent protests in the West Bank.
The paper said that in another incident the IOF fired 80 live bullets “without convincing reasons” at a demonstration in Nabi Saleh village in Ramallah, which killed Rashid Tamimi, 31.
It said that the IOF commander in the area fired teargas canisters at the youths who were protesting the war on Gaza and when the soldiers ran out of canisters he ordered more of them and ordered his soldiers to use live bullets at the demonstrators who were throwing stones.
15 jan 2013
Israeli crime against the Samouni family continues
Amal Samouni
European human rights organization warned of a new crime committed by the occupation against the Samouni family in Gaza, after 21 of its members had been executed during an Israeli military incursion on the Gaza Strip 4 years ago.
The Euro-Mediterranean Observatory for Human Rights said in a statement on Tuesday that the girl who has survived the Israeli massacre, committed against the Samouni family in 2009, suffers today from serious health complications after being hurt in the head by seven pieces of shrapnel from the occupation's rockets.
The human rights Observatory explained that the medical reports of the girl Amal Samouni, 15, show that her situation requires a serious surgical operation that cannot be accomplished in the Palestinian hospitals.
The child's mother told the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory that the Israeli authorities has been preventing them from traveling to the occupied territories and receive treatment in the Israeli hospitals, for "security reasons".
The Geneva based organization has denounced the acquittal by the Israeli military prosecution for the officers responsible for the air strike that had killed 21 members of the Samouni family in January 2009.
It also warned that if Israel continues to prevent Amal from receiving the necessary treatment, the file of the massacre committed against her family will be re-opened at international forums.
European human rights organization warned of a new crime committed by the occupation against the Samouni family in Gaza, after 21 of its members had been executed during an Israeli military incursion on the Gaza Strip 4 years ago.
The Euro-Mediterranean Observatory for Human Rights said in a statement on Tuesday that the girl who has survived the Israeli massacre, committed against the Samouni family in 2009, suffers today from serious health complications after being hurt in the head by seven pieces of shrapnel from the occupation's rockets.
The human rights Observatory explained that the medical reports of the girl Amal Samouni, 15, show that her situation requires a serious surgical operation that cannot be accomplished in the Palestinian hospitals.
The child's mother told the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory that the Israeli authorities has been preventing them from traveling to the occupied territories and receive treatment in the Israeli hospitals, for "security reasons".
The Geneva based organization has denounced the acquittal by the Israeli military prosecution for the officers responsible for the air strike that had killed 21 members of the Samouni family in January 2009.
It also warned that if Israel continues to prevent Amal from receiving the necessary treatment, the file of the massacre committed against her family will be re-opened at international forums.
3 jan 2013
Israeli Commanders on Trial, They're cold blooded killers.
By Stephen Lendman
A previous article said Israel's rap sheet makes serial killers look saintly by comparison. It's no exaggeration. Decades of crimes of war, against humanity and genocide explain.
Accountability so far is wishful thinking. Hope springs eternal. In May 2012, Turkey issued arrest warrants. Four former senior IDF officers were named.
They include Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, military intelligence head Amos Yadlin, naval commander Eliezer Marom, and air force intelligence head Avishai Levi.
They're accused of ordering the May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara massacre. Israeli commandos attacked the vessel preemptively. They did so in international waters.
Nine Turkish nationals were assassinated. Dozens more were injured. Everyone on board was terrorized. Israel planned it that way.
High crimes were committed. A 144-page indictment said so. They were premeditated. They were against unarmed, nonviolent activists. They were delivering vital humanitarian aid to besieged Gazans.
Turkish/Israeli relations became strained. Ankara demanded an apology and compensation for families of victims.
Israel never says it's sorry. It refused and stonewalled. Rogue states operate that way. Turkey's trial is largely symbolic. Proceedings began last November.
Accused Israelis didn't attend. No one expected them to. Entering Turkish territory subjects them to arrest.
Istanbul Prosecutor Mehmet Akif Ekinci seeks 10 consecutive life sentences. It's for nine deaths plus another victim in coma.
Charges include voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, intentional injury, incitement to assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, abduction or confiscation of maritime vessels, property damage, false arrest, and mistreatment of prisoners.
Hundreds of complainants were invited to testify. Conclusions from an internal Turkish investigation accused Israel of "banditry," "piracy," and "state-sponsored terrorism."
Israel is guilty as charged. Clear evidence proves it. More on that below.
On February 21, the Jerusalem Post headlined "Turkey resumes Gaza flotilla trial for four ex-IDF heads," saying:
Israel dismisses proceedings as politically motivated. An unnamed legal official called it a "show trial."
Last year's proceedings focused on murder charges. Current ones address mistreatment, sexual harassment, property theft, and violations of press freedom. Citizens of 37 countries are involved. Hundreds demand justice.
On February 26, Mondoweiss contributor James Marc Leas headlined "Years of impunity for Israeli leaders may draw to a close in Turkish flotilla trial."
Uneditied raw video is damning. It's authentic. It points fingers the right way. Videographer Iara Lee took it. It provides over an hour of "minute-by-minute" documented evidence.
A previous article said Israel's rap sheet makes serial killers look saintly by comparison. It's no exaggeration. Decades of crimes of war, against humanity and genocide explain.
Accountability so far is wishful thinking. Hope springs eternal. In May 2012, Turkey issued arrest warrants. Four former senior IDF officers were named.
They include Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, military intelligence head Amos Yadlin, naval commander Eliezer Marom, and air force intelligence head Avishai Levi.
They're accused of ordering the May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara massacre. Israeli commandos attacked the vessel preemptively. They did so in international waters.
Nine Turkish nationals were assassinated. Dozens more were injured. Everyone on board was terrorized. Israel planned it that way.
High crimes were committed. A 144-page indictment said so. They were premeditated. They were against unarmed, nonviolent activists. They were delivering vital humanitarian aid to besieged Gazans.
Turkish/Israeli relations became strained. Ankara demanded an apology and compensation for families of victims.
Israel never says it's sorry. It refused and stonewalled. Rogue states operate that way. Turkey's trial is largely symbolic. Proceedings began last November.
Accused Israelis didn't attend. No one expected them to. Entering Turkish territory subjects them to arrest.
Istanbul Prosecutor Mehmet Akif Ekinci seeks 10 consecutive life sentences. It's for nine deaths plus another victim in coma.
Charges include voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, intentional injury, incitement to assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, abduction or confiscation of maritime vessels, property damage, false arrest, and mistreatment of prisoners.
Hundreds of complainants were invited to testify. Conclusions from an internal Turkish investigation accused Israel of "banditry," "piracy," and "state-sponsored terrorism."
Israel is guilty as charged. Clear evidence proves it. More on that below.
On February 21, the Jerusalem Post headlined "Turkey resumes Gaza flotilla trial for four ex-IDF heads," saying:
Israel dismisses proceedings as politically motivated. An unnamed legal official called it a "show trial."
Last year's proceedings focused on murder charges. Current ones address mistreatment, sexual harassment, property theft, and violations of press freedom. Citizens of 37 countries are involved. Hundreds demand justice.
On February 26, Mondoweiss contributor James Marc Leas headlined "Years of impunity for Israeli leaders may draw to a close in Turkish flotilla trial."
Uneditied raw video is damning. It's authentic. It points fingers the right way. Videographer Iara Lee took it. It provides over an hour of "minute-by-minute" documented evidence.
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It "shows Israeli soldiers firing weapons at the ship at least 5 minutes and 30 seconds before other Israeli soldiers are seen rappelling down to the ship from a helicopter." In other words, it was premeditated. It's well before anyone on board had time to react.
Israeli officials lied. They claimed boarding commandos acted in self-defense. They initiated attacks guns blazing. They singled out targeted victims. They murdered them in cold blood. They did so at point blank range. Footage showed in court "was formally released at a" UN June 10, 2010 press conference. Gunfire began at "36:08 on the film." "(I)t appears to be coming from an Israeli Zodiac boat. (It was) alongside the" Mavi Marmara. "The first explosive device is at 36:13." Over the next few minutes, gunfire and explosions are heard. |
At 36:39, closeups show Israeli soldiers on the Zodiac firing at unarmed civilians.
Video "shows flashes from guns and an Israeli soldier with a rifle aimed up at the ship."
From 36:08 - 37:17, lots of firing and explosions are heard.
At 37:40, the first helicopter sound is heard.
At 38:24, "red dripping on the walls is seen, and someone keeps saying blood."
At 39:12, "(s)omeone else says "I think they are using paintball looking stuff. It is not live ammunition."
From 39:40 - 40:15, audible helicopter sound gets louder. At 40:28, it's visible.
At 41:58, six or seven commandos "are seen rappelling down along two different ropes"."
At 42:29, the helicopter lifts away. At 42:40, passenger noise level rises.
At 42:49, 43:18, and 43: 35, gunfire is heard. At 43:29, wounded are seen carried away.
"At 44:18, Kevin, an American, shows a booklet obtained from one of the Israeli soldiers"."
It shows pictures of activists on board Israel wanted to kill. They knew in advance who to target.
"(F)ootage shows Israeli soldiers firing weapons and shooting explosive devices beginning at least 5 minutes and 30 seconds before other Israeli soldiers came rappelling down their rope from (their) helicopter."
These facts contradict Israel's self-defense claim. It doesn't wash. Clear evidence proves otherwise. So do numerous victim testimonies.
"Israeli government forces seized electronic devices, including cameras, computers, cell phones, and memory cards"."
Israeli released footage was fake. It was staged. It doesn't wash. It was filmed in advance on a Mavi Marmara replica. It showed passengers attacking soldiers.
Clear evidence shows Israeli commandos committed cold-blooded murder. If Turkish authorities are serious, they'll find IDF commanders guilty of high crimes. Doing so will set a precedent. It's high time that happened.
Video "shows flashes from guns and an Israeli soldier with a rifle aimed up at the ship."
From 36:08 - 37:17, lots of firing and explosions are heard.
At 37:40, the first helicopter sound is heard.
At 38:24, "red dripping on the walls is seen, and someone keeps saying blood."
At 39:12, "(s)omeone else says "I think they are using paintball looking stuff. It is not live ammunition."
From 39:40 - 40:15, audible helicopter sound gets louder. At 40:28, it's visible.
At 41:58, six or seven commandos "are seen rappelling down along two different ropes"."
At 42:29, the helicopter lifts away. At 42:40, passenger noise level rises.
At 42:49, 43:18, and 43: 35, gunfire is heard. At 43:29, wounded are seen carried away.
"At 44:18, Kevin, an American, shows a booklet obtained from one of the Israeli soldiers"."
It shows pictures of activists on board Israel wanted to kill. They knew in advance who to target.
"(F)ootage shows Israeli soldiers firing weapons and shooting explosive devices beginning at least 5 minutes and 30 seconds before other Israeli soldiers came rappelling down their rope from (their) helicopter."
These facts contradict Israel's self-defense claim. It doesn't wash. Clear evidence proves otherwise. So do numerous victim testimonies.
"Israeli government forces seized electronic devices, including cameras, computers, cell phones, and memory cards"."
Israeli released footage was fake. It was staged. It doesn't wash. It was filmed in advance on a Mavi Marmara replica. It showed passengers attacking soldiers.
Clear evidence shows Israeli commandos committed cold-blooded murder. If Turkish authorities are serious, they'll find IDF commanders guilty of high crimes. Doing so will set a precedent. It's high time that happened.
